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A central pillar of the sustainability movement is the call to include environmental 
accounting in standard measures of economic performance. This increased 
transparency would, in principle, mitigate the temptation of economic managers and 
policy makers to increase growth in material consumption at the expense of the 
environment. Moreover, as Repetto (1989) and others have argued, deducting 
depreciation of produced capital from NNP but not deducting depreciation of natural 
capital is inconsistent and debases NNP as a possible indicator of welfare. Based on 
the evidence available, it appears that while GNNP is substantially less than 
NNP, these adjustments do not adversely compromise existing estimates of economic 
growth for China. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper assesses the nature and degree of environmental degradation and resource 
depletion in China and their relationship to economic activity and environmental 
policies. We describe regulatory and other policies and consider their political 
economy determinants. Inasmuch as this objective can only be partially achieved, we 
hope to contribute to a research agenda for environmental and resource economics in 
China. 
Claims have been made that the damage to China’s environment is significant 
and has had a negative influence on economic growth. Critics argue that uncontrolled 
waste of resources and environmental degradation have offset much of China’s 
economic growth over the past twenty-five years. Accordingly, a secondary objective 
of this chapter is to address whether environmentally augmented accounting 
substantially reduces the magnitude of China’s economic gains. 
We begin by reviewing evidence on air and water pollution, including 
environmental Kuznets curves (EKCs) for three major air pollutants, in the 
“Pollution” section. The section on “Natural Capital” follows with an overview of the 
country’s natural resources, and how their quality and quantity have changed over 
time. In the “Natural Resources Kuznets Curve” section, we develop a theory 
regarding a country’s natural resource Kuznets curve and apply it to empirical data 
on the value of China’s natural resource degradation over a thirty-year period. To 
formally address the question of China’s growth rate, we extend green accounting   3
theory to facilitate a comparison of conventionally measured net national product 
(NNP) and green NNP (GNNP). The section on “Green Net National Product” 
provides a discussion of forces that cause GNNP to grow at first more slowly but 
then faster than NNP. Available estimates of China’s GNNP conform to these 
predictions. An indicator of sustainability similar to genuine saving, termed genuine 
capital accumulation (GKA), is shown to be dramatically increasing in the “Genuine 
Capital Accumulation” section. The section on “Policy Environment” reviews the 
current policy environment, emphasizing both accomplishments and shortcomings, 
and the last section concludes. 
POLLUTION 
Air Pollution 
Currently, the three air pollutants of concern are sulfur dioxide (SO2) from the 
burning of coal for power generation; nitrous oxides (NOx), mainly from motor 
vehicle emissions; and total suspended particles (TSP) due in part to the growing 
desertification of the Northwest and energy consumption in the South. Due to 
China’s dependence on coal (68 percent of energy consumption), windblown SO2 
emissions from China may account for more than 13 percent of sulfur deposits in 
South Korea and up to 50 percent in Japan (Wishnick, 2005). Higher incomes have 
led to increased car ownership (although this is still less than 2 percent), and motor 
vehicles account for 45–60 percent of NOx emissions and 85 percent of CO2   4
emissions in cities (Wishnick, 2005). One-third of China’s total land area is prone to 
desertification, including 262 million hectares of pastoral and oasis land in the 
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces. 
Air pollution is a major health issue. Ambient and indoor air pollution has 
been blamed for the high incidence of premature deaths (World Bank, 1997). 
Particulate matter with a diameter less than 10 microns (PM-10) is the most 
damaging air pollutant in terms of health costs. In 2002, China’s State Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) tested the air quality in over 300 cities and found that 
two-thirds did not meet standards set by the World Health Organization (WHO) for 
acceptable levels of TSP (Economy, 2004). In 1995, the World Bank estimated that 
health damages due to air pollution accounted for 7.1 percent of national income 
(World Bank, 1995). This estimate may be inflated, however, inasmuch as the 
methodology infers the value of life in China from U.S. estimates, without 
accounting for the extent of overpopulation (see, e.g., Dasgupta, 1993, 2001). 
A recent report from the State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA, 2004) asserts that either air pollution in major cities has been improving or 
the speed of deterioration has decreased, with falling emission levels and improved 
efficiency in plants. Total levels of NOx, as shown in Figure 1, have fallen recently. 
Statistics show that SO2 and TSP have been declining in the major cities since the 
mid-1980s, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. These figures represent ambient   5
concentrations of the three major pollutants for eleven of China’s major cities.
1 With 
China’s rapid development, a natural question arises regarding how these levels have 
fallen given increased production and economic output over this same period. For 
example, SEPA asserts that in 2002, national environmental quality was maintained 
at the level of the previous year, while the national gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew by 8 percent. Furthermore, SEPA (2004) reports reduced levels of dust and 
sulfur dioxide, stable water quality, and improved air quality in many cities. 














































(Note: The observations are population-weighted averages of data for individual 
cities. Source: Ambient concentration data: World Bank’s Development Research 
Group (DRG); population data: http://www.citypopulation.de/China.html.) 
 
 
                                                 
1 The sample cities are as follows: Tianjin, Guangzhou, Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Changchun, 
Taiyuan, Anshan, Nanchang, Shenzhen, Yinchuan, and Guilin (chosen for their completeness of data).   6
 

































































































The statistical picture of pollution trends contrasts starkly with bleak 
qualitative reports by authors, such as Economy (2004). Indeed, the evidence in   7
Dasgupta et al. (2002), Gallagher (2003), and Diesendorf (2003) suggests that 
China’s environmental regulations are ahead of where European countries were at 
similar levels of per capita income. What additional data might give a more complete 
picture of the trends in air pollution? Some areas of possible improvement are 
discussed later. The first issue pertains to the measurement of TSP and NOx 
concentrations. A second issue concerns the decentralization of polluting industries 
and the lack of solid source–receptor data. 
The measurement of TSP concentrations is complicated by its ambiguous 
components. Since TSP is the general name for particulate matter up to 40 microns in 
diameter, authorities measure the concentration of TSP per cubic meter of air. 
Nothing can be deduced about the small versus large particles within this cubic 
meter. The problem is that the most accurate measure of serious particulate pollution 
is fine particulate matter, or PM-10. While the United States monitors particulates as 
small as PM-2.5, PM-10 monitoring data in China are scarce (although daily 
monitoring of PM-10 has recently begun in some cities). Based on correlations 
between PM-10 and TSP in other data sets, a World Bank study (2001b) found that 
PM-10 is the most damaging air pollutant in China in terms of health complications. 
The smaller particles are directly emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels 
and also result from postproduction photochemical reactions. The larger particles are 
the result of fugitive dust from wind and soil erosion and particles from industrial 
processes, such as metal and fiber production. So while total TSP emissions appear to   8
be falling, it is unclear how the composition of the fine versus coarse particulates is 
changing. Concentrations of PM-10 may actually be increasing, even as TSP is 
decreasing, but this cannot be ascertained without more detailed information on the 
composition of TSP measurements. 
There is a similar problem with the measurement of nitrous oxides. NOx is 
measured as any combination of N and O, whether it be NO or NO2 (as with TSP, 
authorities have begun measuring NO2 separately, although not on a large-scale basis 
across the country). Uncertainty about the composition makes levels of NOx difficult 
to compare with NO2 gas concentrations reported in the United States and is referred 
to widely in the literature on air pollution epidemiology and health. Researchers have 
found that NO2 level averages two-thirds of the NOx level in China (U.S. Embassy 
Beijing, 1998). 
In recent years, the government has begun to decentralize the polluting 
industries.
2 But as industry moves out of cities, the pollution data are still largely 
collected in these cities. It is possible then that total emissions may be increasing, but 
are more decentralized. Although it appears that urban China has stabilized or 
reduced ambient concentrations of the three major pollutants, air quality data are 
generally unavailable outside of major cities. Supplementary data are needed on the 
                                                 
2 SEPA’s Ninth Five-Year Plan includes moving hundreds of polluters out of major industrial areas to 
curb pollution in those areas. In 2001, around 1 million square meters were cleared in Beijing as a 
result of relocations and another 6 million square meters are scheduled for clearing between 2001 and 
2005. The city of Beijing wishes to move polluters out, making room for industrial marketing, 
research institutes, and more environment-friendly industries.   9
level of pollutants elsewhere, especially in the areas to which polluting industries are 
dispersing. Additionally, because source–receptor data are unavailable, it is hard to 
know how pollution created by specific industries affects various areas. Some will 
end up concentrated within the same city it was produced in; other polluters will have 
their emissions blown out of the region, with adverse impacts instead affecting 
downwind areas. It is not clear that current policies take these issues into account. 
Although the statistics focus on large cities, the trend toward decentralization 
does have an important economic justification. Falling emissions in the cities means 
fewer people may be exposed to the pollution. It follows that decentralization of 
industry may significantly reduce health damages. 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
The EKC is a stylized fact according to which air pollution first increases and then 
falls as per capita income rises. The standard explanation is that environmental 
quality is a luxury good and that political economy forces induce environmental 
regulation accordingly. The rise and fall of the manufacturing sector relative to the 
whole economy and the comparative advantage that low-income countries have in 
the exportation of “dirty goods” are also cited (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; 
Panayotou, 1993; Lieb, 2002). 
Figures 1–3 depict the population-weighted average ambient concentration 
levels of NOx, SO2, and TSP for eleven cities from 1981 to 2001. The majority of   10
these eleven cities are major population centers. To investigate whether these 
pollutants followed the stylized EKC shape, we conducted a fixed-effects regression 
analysis for three pollutants in eighty cities from 1990 to 2001. Results for the three 
regressions are presented in Table 1 and are illustrated in Figures 4–6. While the 
order of emissions reaching their turning points in other countries is typically SO2, 
TSP, and then NOx (Brown, 2005), for China we find that the NOx turns first at a per 
capita income level of around 28,000 yuan (approximately 3,461 U.S. dollars), 
followed by TSP around 44,000 yuan (approximately 5,440 U.S. dollars), and then 
finally SO2, which is just reaching the flat portion of its curve around 58,000 yuan (or 
approximately 7,171 U.S. dollars). The order of the turning points appears to be 
reversed from that of Western countries, presumably due to the early fall in NOx. 
Table 1. Regression Results  
Per Capita Emissions  NOx Per Capita  SO2 Per Capita  TSP Per Capita 
GDP per capita  0.0000387 
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(0.0281)   11
Constant  0.263  0.089  2.265 
R-square  0.17  0.22  0.11 
F-value  53.70  74.06  32.75 
Note: Standard errors have been given in parentheses.   12
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The early turning point and the dramatic reduction in emissions of the NOx 
EKC (Figure 4) may be an accurate portrayal of NOx in industry, but may 
misrepresent what is happening to total NOx, including mobile sources. Given the 
rapid increase in automobile ownership after our data period (1990–2001), it is quite 
possible that total NOx is now increasing. In 2002, automobile purchases increased 
by 56 percent. In 2003, purchases grew by 75 percent and by another 15 percent in 
2004, when the government tightened rules on credit for car purchases.
3 A 25 percent 
                                                 
3 “Dream Machines.” The Economist. June 2, 2005, available at 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4032842.    15
increase in auto sales from 2005 to 2006, with sales reaching 7.22 million units, 
indicates a strengthening of auto consumer demand despite recent regulatory 
measures (China Daily, 2007). Indeed, a revised EKC for NOx may eventually show 
two peaks. This helps to remind us that EKC is a stylized fact, not an economic law, 
and that the revealed pattern may not always conform to the simple one-turning-point 
case because of sectoral composition, trade patterns, and other complicating factors.
4 
The EKC for TSP takes the expected shape and the turning point is consistent 
with other studies. Falling per capita emissions despite rapid growth of heavy 
industry and manufacturing could reflect that either the country’s reforestation efforts 
are indeed working or there is a problem with seasonal measurement (see section 
“Soil” for further discussion). There is also the issue of the exact makeup of TSP. 
While the smaller particles that are more detrimental to human health (less than 10 
ppm) have begun showing up as separate measurements, it is not clear how the total 
composition had changed over time. Another issue that may be leading to the 
decrease in reported emissions is that manufacturing activities have, to some extent, 
moved away from city centers, even though the receptors that monitor pollution have 
remained relatively fixed. Finally, China appears to be just reaching the flat portion 
of its EKC for SO2 emissions. 
                                                 
4 The NOx discussion is suggestive of a “weak EKC hypothesis” according to which emissions 
increase in the early stages of development and decrease in the latter stages. In intermediate stages of 
development there may be one or more turning points.   16
Auffhammer, Carson, and Garin-Munoz (2004) found that most areas in 
China are likely approaching the flat portion of the EKC for CO2; that is, further 
increases in per capita income will not tend to cause increases in per capita carbon 
emissions. Using more recent data, however, Auffhammer and Carson (2006) came 
to a very different conclusion. Utilizing a provincial-level panel data set with 588 
observations (thirty provinces from 1985 to 2004), CO2 emissions are forecast to 
increase dramatically over the next decade. The authors conclude that China’s CO2 
emissions are highly unlikely to peak in the coming decade absent a dramatic change 
in energy policies and question the stationarity of EKCs in light of structural 
economic shifts, especially over space.
5 On the other hand, CO2 may be the exception 
that proves the EKC rule. 
Inasmuch as carbon emissions are a global public good, the effect of rising 
incomes on the demand for cleaner air would not be expected to appreciably increase 
regulations aimed at reducing carbon emissions. Another cause of the EKC pattern is 
that in the course of economic development, the relatively clean service sector grows 
faster than the manufacturing sector, and emissions eventually decline accordingly. 
In China’s case, however, vigorous relative growth of manufacturing has persisted 
beyond the typical level of per capita income because of the larger role of exports in 
China’s development. Finally, Auffhammer and Carson proxy CO2 emissions by 
                                                 
5 The authors suggest that the magnitude of the projected increase is several times larger than the 
recommended carbon reductions induced by the Kyoto Protocol and that China’s carbon emissions 
will surpass U.S. carbon emissions by 2010.    17
waste-gas emissions, which are presumably positively affected by the rapid growth in 
the stock and use of automobiles. 
These observations suggest that China’s emission history is mostly consistent 
with the EKC hypothesis and indicates that total pollution per capita may have 
stabilized or begun to fall, despite rapidly increasing production. This conclusion is 
limited by the possibilities of measurement error in NOx and TSP and by the 
mitigating effects of decentralization and increased automobile ownership. 
Nonetheless, it appears that China’s regulatory policies have achieved an overall 
turning point in air pollution, especially in terms of exposure,
6 at a per capita income 
less than the income level at which European countries reached peak levels of 
contamination. 
Water Pollution 
Much less progress has been made with respect to water quality improvements. 
Water pollution problems are especially severe in the North, particularly in the 
catchments of the Hai and Huang (Yellow) rivers and in the Huai in central China. 
The last decade has brought improvement to some of the larger rivers even as the 
total picture continues to deteriorate. It has been said that even if all point sources 
that empty into these northern rivers complied 100 percent with national discharge 
standards, the river systems would still be environmentally overloaded. Freshwater 
lakes and coastal water quality have not improved, and there is evidence that 
                                                 
6 Exposure is a measure of pollution that weighs emissions according to exposed population.   18
groundwater pollution may be increasing (World Bank, 2001b). The most 
problematic pollutant is organic material from industrial and domestic sources. 
Table 2 shows water quality
7 of some major rivers. The rivers evaluated 
include the southeast, southwest, and northwest systems, including the Songhua, 
Liao, Hai, Huai, Huang, Changjiang (Yangtze), and Zhu (Pearl) rivers. These rivers 
drain over 45 percent of total land area and account for more than 54 percent of its 
freshwater resources. While the total length of the rivers evaluated continues to 
increase, the percentage “above standard” remains fairly constant, signaling falling 
water quality in more water bodies. 
Table 2. Water Quality Trends in China’s Rivers, 1997–2003 
  Water Class  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Total length of rivers evaluated 
(km) 
65,405  109,700  113,600  114,043  121,010  122,602  134,593 
I    5.4  5.5  4.9  5.0  5.6  5.7 
II  32.8  24.4  24.5  24.0  27.6  33.1  30.7 
% in water 
class 
III  26.3  33.0  32.4  29.8  28.8  26.0  26.2 
                                                 
7 China’s water bodies are divided into five classes according to their utilization and protection status: 
Class I applies to the water from remote sources and national nature reserves. Class II consists of 
“protected areas for centralized sources of drinking water, the protected areas for rare fishes, and the 
spawning fields of fishes and shrimps.” Class III applies to the “second class of protected areas for 
centralized sources of drinking water and protected areas for the common fishes and swimming areas.” 
Class IV covers “the water areas for industrial use and entertainment which is not directly touched by 




56.4  62.8  62.4  58.7  61.4  64.7  62.6 
IV    13.7  12.6  16.1  14.2  12.2  10.9 
V  27.7  6.6  7.8  8.1  7.8  5.6  5.8 
V+  15.9  16.9  17.2  17.1  16.6  17.5  20.7 
 
If we were to separate these percentages for the North and South, the 
percentage of poor-class water bodies would be significantly higher in the North. The 
incidence of Class V and worse tends to be about three times higher in the North 
(World Bank, 2001b). Rapid industrialization of the North, with its accompanying 
population growth, means that more people are relying on increasingly worse water 
supplies. The number and probably the proportion of people using the poorer classes 
of water are likely to be rising. Table 3 documents similar trends in the country’s 
lakes. 




1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
January 
2005 
Total number of lakes 
evaluated 
16  24  24  24  24  52  52   20
III or 
above 
37.5  41.7  37.5  41.7  25.0  40.4  40.4 
Partially 
polluted 






37.5  37.5  45.8  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0 
 
  
Class V and worse water continues to be used by households and agriculture, 
posing dire health risks. SEPA samples do not include smaller rivers, which are said 
to be in extremely poor shape as a result of the discharge from township village 
enterprises (TVEs). Water quality in the Huai River is reportedly getting worse again, 
despite considerable effort by the government. In Guiyu, in Guangdong Province, 
levels of lead in the water were 2,400 times higher than WHO drinking guidelines 
(Economy, 2004). 
Furthermore, total wastewater discharge is increasing, particularly in the 
residential sector. Although increased regulations have ameliorated industrial 
discharge, the total amount of wastewater is increasing. Confounding the problem is 
the increasing reality of water shortages. The combination of growing waste 
discharge (see Figure 7) and shrinking water flows exacerbates the already serious 
water pollution issues. This situation is illustrated in Figure 7.   21  22
Figure 7. Wastewater Trends, 1990–2003 
 
 
In the absence of comprehensive time-series data on groundwater quality, 
information concerning groundwater quality remains anecdotal. Groundwater usage 
is poorly controlled. Excessive extraction has become common, particularly in the 
North. Anecdotal evidence suggests that groundwater quality is deteriorating, 
especially in near-surface aquifers and the vicinity of major cities (World Bank, 
2001b).   23
NATURAL CAPITAL 
Forests 
Centuries of population growth have burdened China with a long history of 
deforestation. In addition, China spent the second half of the twentieth century 
overexploiting its timber resources and then mandating reforestation/afforestation 
(Yearbook, 2005).
8 The forestry management regime is split between the state and 
the local communities. State management covers only about 20 percent of the total 
resources, although this segment contains the higher-quality trees. The remaining 
reserves are collectively managed forests, which are owned by local communities and 
operated by village leaders. 
Government’s concern over the high levels of timber cutting was first 
documented in 1950 when the government issued “Instructions on the Work of 
National Forestry” to stop the random felling of trees (China Report). Afforestation 
became a government prerogative the next year, mandated in “Instructions on 
Strengthening the Leadership for the Work of Forestry” (China Report). Despite the 
government’s efforts, forest cover continued to decrease to 12 percent of China’s 96 
million square kilometers of land area, as calculated in the Third Forest Census of 
1983–1987 (Yearbook). This is approximately 115,250,000 hectares of forestland 
(Yearbook). Subsequent data show a slight recovery due to increases in both 
                                                 
8 Reforestation is the process of encouraging forest growth in lands that were previously forested, 
basically replenishing depleted forests. Afforestation is the process of converting previously 
unforested land into forests, or the process of forest creation.   24
afforestation and reforestation (see Tables 4 and 5). The proportion of afforestation 
for the purpose of timber harvest declined dramatically in the late twentieth century, 
while the lands designated for nature preserves increased substantially. 
Data for the volume of timber harvested no longer appear among the 
industrial indicators in the Yearbook after 1987. This may reflect the government’s 
decision to scale back the timber industry. The timber harvest peaked volumetrically 
in the late 1980s and has declined since then. 
Table 4. Trends in Forest Resources, 1981–2004 








1981–1982  119.78  12.50  9.35 
1983–1987  115.25  12.00  10.26 
1988–1990  124.65  12.98  9.141 
1991–1996  128.63  13.40  10.868 
1997  133.70  13.92  11.785 
1998–2002  158.94  16.55  12.49 
2004  174.91  18.22  13.618 
 
aForest Standing Stock. 
Source: Yearbook (various year).   25
 
Table 5. China’s Forests: Trends in Planting, Harvesting, and Protection, 1952–
2004 
Year  Total Afforested 
Area (M Ha) 
Afforested for 







1952  1.085  0.50, 46.08  12.33  n.a. 
1957  4.355  1.73, 39.84  27.87  n.a. 
1965  3.426  1.72, 50.41  39.78  n.a. 
1978  4.496  3.13, 69.62  51.62  n.a. 
1984  8.254  5.06, 61.38  58.00  n.a. 
1989  5.0233










b 28.93  52.36
b  88.15 
2000  5.105  1.21, 23.86  47.23
b  98.21 
2001  4.953  0.90, 18.28  45.52  129.89 
2002  7.7709  0.89, 12.73  44.361  132.95 
2003  9.1188  1.17, 12.98  47.58
b  143.98 
2004  5.598  0.87, 15.56  51.97
b  148.23 
   26
a Value calculated based on Timber Industry Production Index found in China Report: Social and Economic 
Development.  
b Data taken from China’s Forestry Statistics Yearbook (various years).
  
c 1988 value.  
d Data taken from China’s Environmental Statistical Yearbook. 
Source: Data taken from Yearbook (various years). 
 
 
The reforms of the 1980s included policies to encourage afforestation and 
limit overharvesting. These policies aimed to change the management practices of 
state forestry enterprises and also to influence the actions of farmers and forest 
dwellers. There is great disagreement about the outcome of these reforms. Some 
observers cite an 8.5 percent increase in national forest cover between 1980 and 1988 
as evidence of success (Yearbook), while others have asserted a negative impact. 
Rozelle et al. (1998) provide evidence that policy changes in the state sector did 
stimulate reforesting, but provided few incentives to curtail high rates of harvesting. 
Indeed, according to Economy (2004), forest resources are characterized by 
decreasing reserves and illegal logging. In the first years of reform, logging increased 
by 25 percent, consistent with the volumetric peak in timber harvests late in the 
1980s. The country is now the world’s second largest consumer of timber.   27
A U.S. Embassy report identifies deforestation as the root cause of the 
increased damages caused by the Yangtze River floods in 1998. It reports that forest 
cover in Sichuan Province decreased from 19 percent in 1950 to a low of 6.5 percent 
and that the average tree-cutting rate was more than double the natural tree growth 
rate. The Earth Policy Institute reports that by 1998, the Yangtze River basin had lost 
85 percent of its total forest cover (Brown, 1998). Destruction of forests results in 
water storage losses as well as silting of the riverbeds and lakes. The Ecological 
Section of the SEPA (reported in the U.S. Embassy document) calculates that 
removing 70,000 hectares of forest eliminates 1 million cubic meters of natural water 
storage. In addition, the root systems of trees help anchor the soil, preventing silt 
from raising the height of the riverbed and, consequently, the heights of the 
floodwaters. Timber harvest rates dropped significantly following the flood crisis. 
In response to this loss of forest cover, the government started the 
conservation set-aside (or offset) program “Grain for Green” in 1999. Easily one of 
the largest conservation set-aside programs in the world, its main objective was to 
increase forest cover on sloped cropland in the upper reaches of the Yangtze and 
Yellow River basins to prevent soil erosion. When available in their community, 
households set aside all or parts of certain types of land and plant seedlings to grow 
trees. In return, the government compensates the participants with grain, cash 
payments, and free seedlings. By the end of 2002, officials expanded the program to   28
twenty-five (of thirty) provinces. To date, 7 million hectares of cultivated land has 
been converted to forest and pasture land.
9 
While this afforestation program certainly reduced domestic food production, 
the land that was removed from tillage was of such low quality (much lower quality 
than the average land that was opened up during the 1980s and 1990s to compensate 
for cultivated land lost to urbanization) that the program had only a marginal impact 
on overall food prices (Rozelle, Uchida, and Xu, 2005). Additionally, afforestation 
campaigns in general, which have had a long history in the country, are often 
undertaken with inappropriate technologies and poor oversight. 
Therefore, despite increased biomass, the value of China’s forests may have 
declined in recent years. Afforestation is taking place on lower-quality land as 
opposed to natural forest habitats and is further from market centers. As a result, 
neither the potential biological nor market benefits are being delivered with the 
optimal effectiveness, for example, regarding the appropriate composition of fast-
growing versus high-value trees. Rozelle, Huang, and Benziger (2003) also report 
evidence that the increase in aggregate forest cover experienced between 1980 and 
1993 came at the expense of forest diversity. With natural forests transformed into 
plantations, the ability to provide environmental services, such as species habitat, has 
                                                 
9 “Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Agriculture, Rural Development, and Farmers,” by Li 
Xiande, Institute of Agricultural Economics, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. May 16, 
2006, presentation to World Bank Institute Beijing, available at 
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/WBI-Training/288464–
1152217173757/Session20_LiXiande.pdf    29
declined. The change in forest structure may also affect the livelihoods of certain 
populations, as well as contribute to growing desertification and increased 
sandstorms in the North.
10 Unfortunately, the official statistics do not allow complete 
verification of these apparent trends. We have data on deforestation and reforestation, 
but no good indicators of actual stock levels. Furthermore, the total reforestation is 
not reported, only what is reforested in a given year. And because the age distribution 
of the timber stock is unknown, it is impossible to estimate the value of this resource. 
Better reporting would account for the changing stock of forest resources, including 
quality, location, and age distribution. 
Water 
Rapid economic growth has led to an increased demand for water, increased water 
pollution, and a change in sources of water pollution. Table 6 describes the change in 
total water resources in China in recent years, and Table 7 reports supply and 
consumption patterns.
11 Although the national supply of freshwater, 2,500 cubic 
meters per capita, is above the World Bank’s definition of a water-scarce country, the 
geographic distribution of China’s water resources is highly uneven. Availability is 
greatest in the South, where average rainfall is as much as nine times greater than that 
in the Northwest. The northern rivers have far less assimilative capacity than 
                                                 
10 In May 2000, then Premier Zhu Rongji warned that the rapidly advancing desert would necessitate 
moving the capital from Beijing (Economy, 2004). 
11 Surface water refers to the water volume from rivers, lakes, and glaciers, that is, the surface runoffs 
of natural rivers, lakes, and so on. Groundwater is the water from precipitation and surface water that 
seeps into the ground and is potentially available via pumping. The total water resource figure is found 
by summing the surface water and groundwater and then deducting the overlapping portion.   30
southern rivers, due to lower flows. Distribution of groundwater resources is also 
skewed – the South gaining four times more than the North. Most of the water is 
directed toward agriculture. (Eighty-five percent arable land in the North is irrigated, 
compared with 10 percent in the United States.) 
Access to water resources is increasing due to investments in water resources 
engineering. As of 2000, 85,000 dams had been constructed with a total storage 
capacity of 518 billion cubic meters, of which 397 are large sized with a total storage 
capacity of 326.7 billion cubic meters and 2,634 are medium sized with a total 
storage capacity of 72.9 billion cubic meters. Their engineering projects also include 
270,000 kilometers of embankments and ninety-eight flood storage or detention 
zones for the Yangtze, Yellow, and Huai rivers, with a total area of 34,500 square 
kilometers and a total storage capacity of 100 billion cubic meters (Ministry of Water 
Resources). 
Table 6. Total Water Resources in China
 
Year  Precipitation  Ground Water 
Surface 
Water 




1997  5,816.90  694.20  2,683.50  592.20  2,785.50 
1998  6,763.10  940.00  3,272.60  810.90  3,401.70 
1999  5,970.20  838.70  2,720.40  739.50  2,819.60 
2000  6,009.20  850.20  2,656.20  736.30  2,770.10   31
2001  5,812.20  839.00  2,593.30  745.50  2,686.80 
2002  6,261.00  869.70  2,724.30  768.50  2,825.50 
Note:
 Values are in billion cubic meters. 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, China.   32
Table 7. Water Supply and Consumption in China  





Depletion as % of 
Consumption 
1997  562.30  556.60  317.80  57.10 
1998  547.00  543.50  306.20  56.34 
1999  561.30  559.10  302.80  54.16 
2000  553.10  549.80  301.20  54.78 
2001  556.70  556.70  305.20  54.82 
2002  549.70  549.70  298.50  54.30 
Note:
 Values are in billion cubic meters. 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, China. 
 
Rapid economic growth and a growing population have increased demand. 
Historically, government has met rising demand via dams and other public works that 
capture a greater percentage of available surface water and increase total water 
storage. These are increasingly expensive per unit of water made available and their 
remaining potential quite limited. 
There is evidence of falling water tables, especially in the northern regions. A 
study conducted in 2001 by the Geological Environmental Monitoring Institute in 
Beijing reported that in Hebei Province, the average level of the aquifer dropped 2.9   33
meters in 2000.
12 In some cities around the province, it fell by nearly 6 meters. The 
water deficit (a summation over time of the extent water supplies is below average) 
in the North may now exceed over 40 billion tons per year. 
The most recent water projections suggest that irrigation use will decline from 
73 percent of total consumption to 50 percent in 2050 (World Bank, 2001b). 
Consumption for industrial and urban purposes, however, is expected to increase 
substantially. Since both of these forms of consumption lead to emissions of polluted 
water, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain water quality. The UNDP, UNEP, 
World Bank, and the World Resources Institute define water scarcity as 1,000 cubic 
meters per person or less. The water consumed per person (from both surface and 
groundwater) includes not only what is normally classified as domestic/residential 
water consumption per capita, but also the individual’s share of national water 
consumed for productive activities – agriculture and industry – and the individual’s 
share of water required for ecosystem needs. Using this definition of water scarcity, 
the country as a whole will be classified as water scarce by 2010 at the current rate of 
population growth (Shalizi, 2004). 
There is no clear solution to the enormous disparity in water supply between 
the north and the south of China, nor to the rising overall shortage in per capita 
supply. Although the country is implementing numerous water storage projects and 
building channels intended to transport large volumes of water from south to north, 
                                                 
12 http://www.thestudentzone.com/articles/chinawater.html.    34
the trends of these supply stresses show that they are likely to overwhelm such 
efforts. In particular, the South to North Transfer Project commenced construction in 
2002 and is expected to deliver its first benefits to Beijing residents in 2008. The 
project consists of three canals covering 1,300 kilometers, transferring water from the 
lower, middle, and upper reaches of the Yangtze River by channeling it to the 
Yellow, Huai, and Hai rivers. The Ministry of Water Resources estimates that 94 
percent of the volume of the Yangtze River annually flows into the East China Sea. 
The project is expected to cost 59 billion U.S. dollars and take fifty years to complete 
(MWR, 2007). A U.S. Embassy report questions the engineering feasibility of certain 
aspects of the project, such as crossing the Yellow River, whose bed is rising 
annually due to siltation. Additional criticisms in the report address the lack of 
concern for environmental and supply effects to donor regions, especially in drought 
years, and for the water use rights of downstream localities (U.S. Embassy, 2000). 
The severity of China’s water problems varies widely across regions, with the 
greatest difficulties arising in the northwest and north China regions. Gross 
underpricing of water resources compounds the difficulties arising from rising 
production, population growth, and urbanization. Inevitably, the potential for 
successful water management must rest primarily with demand-side conservation. 
Soil   35
Since the 1990s, desertification
13 has become a major land resource concern. 
Desertification affects some 262 million hectares, giving China the world’s highest 
ratio of actual-to-potential desertification (World Bank, 2001b). The North (including 
the capital of Beijing) has been covered in dust for days at a time, dust that travels as 
far as Japan, Korea, and the United States. It has been estimated that 5 billion tons of 
topsoil is lost every year.
14 
A series of government-sponsored policies to increase grain production, 
partly in response to Lester Brown’s Who Will Feed China (1994), exacerbated 
problems in land-use practices. A 1994 policy required that all cropland used for 
construction (industrialization trend) be offset by land reclaimed elsewhere. Coastal 
provinces paid other provinces to plow land to offset losses, and these provinces 
reclaimed vast tracts of grasslands and continued to plow more land. Overall, the 
campaign failed to achieve its objectives and created unintended consequences, 
including the substitution of poor-quality land for good-quality land. 
Peter Lindert (2000) examined one aspect of Brown’s challenge: can China 
feed itself? Lindert’s analysis suggests that Brown’s findings are somewhat 
exaggerated. Lindert shows econometrically that productivity does not necessarily 
decline with soil loss. There are a number of additional factors that would prevent 
loss of productivity despite loss of soil, for example, sufficient soil depth. 
                                                 
13 Desertification has been defined by the United Nations as “land degradation in arid, semi-arid and 
dry sub-humid areas, resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human 
activities.” 
14 China’s Agenda 21, www.acca21.org.cn/english.    36
This is not to suggest that soil resources are being optimally managed. While 
on-site damages from lost soil may be low, off-site damages may be considerable, 
including siltation in irrigation systems, water transport systems, increased water 
pollution, nearshore effects, and health complications from increased windblown 
dust. These concerns appear to be more serious than productivity loss. Relatedly, 
asking whether China can feed itself may be the wrong question. While the country 
has increased imports, this is a sign of comparative advantage, not necessarily of an 
inability to be self-sufficient in food. 
Energy 
China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, which dominates 
domestic energy consumption and constitutes the chief source of air pollution. Rapid 
economic growth has led to a 5 percent annual increase in energy consumption. It is 
estimated that to meet projected electricity demands in 2020, China would need an 
additional 1.2 billion tons of coal per year (People’s Daily). In its search for 
alternative sources of power, China has constructed mammoth hydroelectric 
generating dams, forayed into solar and wind technology, and, in the last two 
decades, invested significantly in nuclear power production. However, substantial 
reliance on coal, the source of most sulfur dioxide and soot emissions, continues. In 
2000, the per capita stock of domestic reserves was 2.6 tons for petroleum, 1,074 
cubic meters for natural gas, and 90 tons for coal. Forty percent of coal consumption   37
is for electricity generation. Much of it is unwashed, perhaps in part because of the 
water shortages in Northern China. 
Table 8 summarizes trends in China’s consumption of coal. The data show 
rising coal use as well as important changes in the structure of consumption. 
Residential consumption declined by 50 percent between 1990 and 2003, reflecting 
substitution of natural gas and other relatively clean fuels for coal as well as new 
prohibitions against domestic coal burning in many cities. Final consumption of coal 
in industry rose and then fell, apparently reflecting widespread substitution of 
electricity (mainly coal-fired) for direct use of coal to power industrial processes.
15 
Table 8. Coal Use, 1990–2003 
  Final Consumption  Intermediate Consumption 
Year  Residential  Industry  Total  Power 
Generation 
Heating  Coking 
1990  16,699.7  35,773.8  60,205.9  27,204.3  2,995.5  10,697.6 
                                                 
15 Colleagues suggest several explanations for the decline in industrial coal consumption (Wu Kang of 
East West Center and Jeff Brown of FACS, personal communication). First, more advanced 
equipment associated with growing industrialization has called for increased use of electric power. 
The direct use of coal in the industrial sector has, to a great extent, been replaced by coal-fired power, 
which is more energy efficient. Second, diesel is often favored over coal for its cleanliness and 
efficiency. Finally, high hauling charges discourage the transportation of coal and encourage the 
substitution of electricity and diesel. Moreover, imported equipment may run on diesel only, or on 
electric power. As a result, between 1995 and 2002, China’s use of electric power in the industrial 
sector increased notably, the use of diesel was higher, while the use of coal declined. Other 
possibilities for this trend include the relatively longer time it takes to install coal-using capital 
equipment, increased oil demand due to the rapid increase in China’s stock of motor vehicles, and the 
possible difficulty of rapid increases in coal production or even coal imports.    38
1995  13,530.1  46,050.3  66,156.1  44,440.2  5,887.3  18,396.4 
2000  7,907.2  34,122.0  46,821.4  55,811.2  8,794.1  16,496.4 
2003  8,174.7  35,981.2  49,044.8  81,976.5  10,895.5  23,639.9 
2004  8,173.2  46,083.0  59,543.7  91,961.6  11,546.6  25,349.6 
2005  8,739.0  48,040.7  62,154.1  103,098.5  13,542.0  31,667.1 
 
Note: Values are in 10,000 tons. 
Source: Yearbook (2006, Table 7.5).   39
 
At the same time, rising coal production has supported large increases in 
intermediate usage of coal for producing electricity and for heating and (commercial) 
cooking, all of which have recorded substantial growth. Coal consumption for power 
generation alone rose from 272 million tons in 1990 to over 1 billion tons in 2005. In 
addition, rising coal production has allowed China to become the world’s second 
largest coal exporter after Australia, having jumped from 32 million tons in 1998 to 
more than 90 million tons of exports in 2001.
16 This figure continued to grow, 
reaching 94 million tons by 2003, before dropping to 87 and 72 million tons in 2004 
and 2005 (Yearbook). Rapid export growth reflects government assistance to state-
owned coal mines, export incentives, relatively low cost, proximity to Asian markets, 
expanded production capacity, and the desire of some Asian coal buyers to diversify 
their sources of supply. 
Available figures also show important changes in the broader structure of 
energy consumption. Steep increases in the use of oil have led to an increase in the 
ratio of oil-to-coal use, although very recently, that trend has abated (Figure 8). 
Beginning in 1993, China’s trade balance in petroleum turned negative; since then, 
net imports have risen steeply, reaching 138.84 million tons in 2006. This is a 17 
percent increase from imports in 2005; net imports of refined oil were up 38 percent 
the same year (China Daily, 2007). Official forecasts anticipate further growth of 
                                                 
16 Source: Geoff Hiscock, CNN Asia Business Editor. Monday, March 10, 2003, at CNN.com.   40
petroleum imports, which are expected to reach 60 percent of total consumption by 
2020 (www.cei.gov.cn). 
Figure 8. Oil-to-Coal Consumption Ratio, 1980–2003 (Source: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/.) 
 
China has also increased production of natural gas, which has largely replaced 
gasoline as the fuel for buses and taxis. In 2005, natural gas accounted for 3.3 percent 
of China’s energy output and 2.9 percent of consumption, both record levels 
(Yearbook, 2006, p. 261). Plans to construct facilities for large-scale imports of 
liquid natural gas underscore Beijing’s commitment to increase the role of natural gas 
in China’s energy economy.   41
Another effort in this direction is the use of photovoltaics, especially in 
remote southern areas. The success of this endeavor would cut down on transmission 
costs and provide a clean alternative energy source. To tap into the wind resources 
across the country, the country has invested 3.7 million U.S. dollars a year since 
2003.
17 
China has embraced nuclear power as a partial solution to the overwhelming 
levels of pollution caused by their number one source of electricity: coal burning. 
The first nuclear plants in China began producing electricity in 1994, according to the 
World Nuclear Association (WNA). Three reactors were put into operation that year, 
one of which is the first to be designed and constructed entirely by Chinese 
corporations (China National Nuclear Corporation). In 2005, 2.1 percent of China’s 
electricity was provided by nuclear power plants, a total of 52.3 billion kWh (WNA). 
Overall, China appears to be taking clean and renewable energy efforts 
seriously. Taxation is the implementation tool of choice in most cases. The Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Ministry of Finance have 
recommended tax rebates for renewable energy usage, lower taxes on fuel-efficient 
cars, and relief from value-added taxes on energy-saving business investments, along 
with additional taxes imposed on nonrenewable energy usage. Other measures 
include requiring annual reports on energy use and efforts from energy-intensive 
industries, a focus on “green buildings” in new construction, sustainable 
                                                 
17 www.chinaview.cn, August 11, 2005.    42
transportation, and clean energy production (NDRC, 2004; Winning, 2006). China’s 
2006 the Renewable Energy Law stipulates that renewable energy should account for 
10 percent of energy consumption by 2020 (Renewable Energy Access, 2006). Also, 
the central government has called for a general investment slowdown (Oster, 2006), 
but this is not particular to more energy intensive industries and seems to be a general 
check on excessive growth. 
As with water, underpricing undercuts efforts to reduce resource utilization. 
The low user cost of coal burning is especially problematic: at its 2005 annual 
meeting, China’s Senior Policy Advisory Council reported actual external costs of 
SO2 emissions from coal combustion for thermal power generation of 0.0938 
RMB/kWh, a figure ten times the emissions charges for coal combustion, currently 
sit at just 0.0096 RMB/kWh. Such inefficiency clearly provides inadequate incentive 
for Chinese electricity producers to promote reductions in SO2 emissions (China 
Senior Policy Advisory Council Report, 2005). 
Other Resources 
Fisheries 
China is the largest fish producer in the world and has the largest number of fishing 
boats. Since 1990, fish production has ranked first in the world, reaching around 40 
million tons in 1999 and accounting for 30 percent of the world total. Years of   43
overfishing have combined with growing water pollution to erode China’s traditional 
fishery resources. 
The expansion of aquaculture has had a profound impact on the structure of 
the fishery sector. Since 1978, the area of ponds, lakes, reservoirs, and seas used for 
aquaculture has steadily increased. In 1999, this area reached 7.75 million hectares, a 
threefold increase from 1978. Total aquaculture production increased from 1.60 
million tons in 1978 (27 percent of total fisheries production) to 25.78 million tons 
(60 percent) in 2000 (Li, 2003). There has also been a notable movement of labor to 
aquaculture from agriculture/capture fisheries. By 1990, over 2 million people 
switched to aquaculture from agriculture and other industries. Total fishery 
(cultivation plus capture) labor in 2000 reached 18.6 million, of which full-time 
employment in the aquaculture sector reached 3.7 million, a sevenfold increase over 
1978 level (Li, 2003). Other important contributions from aquaculture include 
improvements in fisheries techniques and yields, diversification of farmed species, 
and diversification in modes of farming. 
Minerals 
As of early 2003, total mineral reserves included 158 detected minerals, with 10 
energy minerals, 54 metal minerals, 91 nonmetal minerals, and 3 liquid–gas   44
minerals.
18 China possesses abundant deposits of metallic minerals, such as iron ore. 
As of 1996, estimated reserves of iron ore amounted to 46.3 billion tons, which 
placed among world leaders in this category, following Russia, Australia, Canada, 
and Brazil (Liu, 2007). Iron ore is found in most regions of China. The northeast and 
north China areas have the richest reserves, followed by the southwest. Among 
China’s provinces, Liaoning ranks first in proved reserves, followed by Hebei, 
Sichuan, Shanxi, Anhui, Yunnan, and Inner Mongolia (Ministry of Land and 
Resources, People’s Republic of China). Ore quality is generally low, however, with 
the average grade of China’s iron ore at only 37.5 percent (Liu Haoting, from China’s 
Steel Industry Yearbook). 
While reserves of highly demanded minerals have been depleted, reserves of 
rare minerals such as tungsten, stibium, and rare earth elements are plentiful. 
Reserves of manganese, gold, and silver have been increasing steadily since the 
1950s. In particular, from 1991 to 1995, total known gold reserves increased by over 
300 percent. By the end of 1994, the reserve of rare earth elements
19 was 107.35 
billion tons, the most in the world. 
Despite the large scale of mineral resources, China’s per capita reserves are 
low and falling. By 2020, dependence on imported crude oil is expected to rise to 60 




19 There are seventeen rare earth elements: scandium, yttrium, lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, 
neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, 
thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium.   45
percent and natural gas to 40 percent. According to projections of future supply and 
demand, by 2020, domestic resources will fully supply only nine of forty-five 
varieties. In particular, crude oil, iron ore, copper, and bauxite, items essential to 
national economic security, are all in long-term deficit.  
As the ratio of income and manufacturing output to domestic mineral 
resources continues to decline, future growth will require large imports of an 
expanding array of mineral products. The scale of future imports and the range of 
minerals needed have propelled Chinese efforts to establish a wide network of trade 
partners to supply these mineral demands. Declining mineral reserves implies that the 
country will become increasingly dependent on trade for nonrenewable resources. 
This dependence may lead China’s foreign policy to emphasize cooperative 
approaches to resolving contentious international issues (Brandt, Rawski, and Zhu, 
2007). 
NATURAL RESOURCES KUZNETS CURVE 
Natural Resources Kuznets Curve Theory 
The EKC theory has been well developed in the literature. In this section, we propose 
a “natural resource Kuznets curve” (NRKC), whereby both resource extraction and 
the value of this extraction initially increase, reach a peak, and then decrease over 
time with increased wealth. Figure 9 illustrates the idea for a nonrenewable resource, 
where t is time,  N p  represents the shadow price of the resource, x represents   46
extraction of the resource, and the dotted variables represent the associated time 
derivatives. During early stages of development (phase 1), resource extraction 
increases as the economy industrializes. Extraction increases at an increasing rate, 
until rising extraction costs squeeze resource rents (Hotelling-Hansen effect, 
Hotelling 1931, Hansen 1980) causing the rate of extraction to decline, even in the 
face of rising demand. For a rapidly growing economy such as China, comparative 
advantage shifts to manufactured goods and away from the production of primary 
goods, including energy. Eventually increased demand for energy is sufficiently 
offset by increased energy imports that the Hotelling-Hansen effect dominates, thus 
causing extraction to fall, as shown in phase 3. 
Figure 9. Phases of a Natural Resources Kuznets Curve   47
 
 
Based on the path of resource extraction and resource prices shown in Figure 
9, we lay out the corresponding trend in the total value of resource extraction in 
Figure 10. Initially, the value of resource extraction increases as both price and the 
extraction rate rise. As the decrease in extraction rate comes to dominate the 
decelerating increase in resource price, the value of extraction begins to decline. This 
represents the Kuznets relation for the value of resource extraction. 
Figure 10. Value of Resource Extraction over Time    48
A 
similar story can be told for renewable resources. In the initial phase, resources such 
as forests and fisheries are depleted; later on, in a second phase, the rate of depletion 
slows. In contrast to nonrenewable resources, renewable resources accumulate (or 
decline) according to the difference between the stock’s natural growth rate and the 
amount harvested. As a result, the Kuznets peak will arrive sooner than with 
nonrenewables. In phase 3, total extraction will begin to fall as depreciation 
approaches zero. As capital accumulation increases the marginal product of 
renewable resources throughout the economy, and as comparative advantage induces 
increasing imports of renewable resource products, the domestic stock of renewable 
resources eventually increases; that is, harvest is less than natural growth plus 
replanting/restocking. In this phase, the value of net renewable resource depletion 
becomes negative. 
NRKC Empirics   49
Using data from the World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings Data Center (World Bank, 
2001a), we calculate the value of a corresponding natural resource Kuznets curve for 
forests, minerals, and energy. Data for selected years are presented in Table 9. For 
net forest depletion, rent on depletion was calculated as the rent on that amount of 
extraction that exceeded the natural increment in wood volume. For mineral and 
energy depletion, rent was measured as the market value of extracted material minus 
the average extraction cost. Note that this estimate is a preliminary indicator. 
Ongoing data collection may make it possible to expand the estimate in the future to 
include other resources, such as soil, water, and marine resources.   50
Table 9. The Value of Resource Depletion, Selected Years 1975–2000  
Year  NNP  Net Forest Depletion  Mineral Depletion  Energy Depletion 
1975  159.07  0.10  1.26  19.62 
1980  213.85  0.35  1.83  38.66 
1985  289.07  0.85  2.54  40.88 
1990  412.76  1.39  3.28  33.58 
1995  677.74  1.47  3.24  31.11 
2000  1,061.41  0.73  2.65  31.76 
 
Note: Values are in billions, 2004 U.S. dollars; ten-year moving averages are reported, with the exception of 
2000, which is a three-year average. 
We illustrate the NRKC by summing up the values of China’s forests, 
minerals, and energy depletion in Figure 11.   represents the peak of the NRKC for 
this series. The peak’s relationship to the growth rate of a green accounting income 
measure is examined in the next section. 
' T  51
Figure 11. Natural Resource Kuznets Curve: Value of Resource Depletion, 1970–






































GREEN NET NATIONAL PRODUCT 
GNNP: Theory 
A central pillar of the sustainability movement is the call to include environmental 
accounting in standard measures of economic performance. This increased 
transparency would, in principle, mitigate the temptation of economic managers and 
policymakers to increase growth in material consumption at the expense of the 
environment. Moreover, as Repetto (1989) and others have argued, deducting 
depreciation of produced capital from NNP but not deducting depreciation of natural 
capital is inconsistent and debases NNP as a possible indicator of welfare. In addition 
to deducting the depreciation in natural capital, GNNP treats pollution in a more   52
appropriate fashion. While defensive expenditures to limit pollution are counted as 
production in current NNP accounting, the correct practice is to deduct both 
defensive expenditures and pollution, valued at its marginal damage cost. 
Accordingly, defensive expenditures must be deducted twice from the standard 
accounts. 
The theoretical framework for GNNP requires consideration of three separate 
categories: nonrenewable resources, renewable resources, and pollution (stock and 
flow). For distinction, we refer to GNNP as the complete green income measure 
(subtracting both the depreciation of natural capital and the pollution damages) and 
 as excluding adjustments for pollution. For nonrenewable resources in a 
closed economy,   grows faster than NNP if and only if 
' GNNP
' GNNP ( ) NN N ypx y x px p −+ && &  
> 0, where y represents NNP,  N p  represents the first-best shadow price of the 
resource, x represents extraction of the resource, and the dotted variables represent 
the associated time derivatives.
20 In the early stages of economic growth, both a 
country’s resource extraction rate and the price of the resources are increasing, 
resulting in GNNP growing more slowly than NNP. (That is, the second term 
dominates the first.) In later stages, the change in resource extraction decreases due 
to increased resource scarcity and – in the case of a rapidly growing economy – to the 
shifting comparative advantage in manufactures relative to resources. Moreover, the 
Hotelling-Hansen effect causes the rate of the price increase to decline. The two 
                                                 
20 This condition is obtained by taking the time derivative of GNNP.    53
forces combine to make the first term dominate the second (and the second term to 
eventually become negative). Thus GNNP  (i.e., adjusting for resource depletion but 
not pollution) will grow faster than NNP, as illustrated in Figure 12. 
'
Figure 12. Growth of NNP versus GNNP′ and GNNP 
 
' T  in Figure 12 corresponds to the peak of the NRKC described in section 
“NRKC Empirics” earlier and represents the point at which GNNP  will begin 
growing faster than NNP. As suggested by Figure 11, China has already passed this 
peak. With optimal management, stock pollution, for example, coral reef 
sedimentation, will demonstrate an EKC similar to NRKC. Adding pollution to 
 results in a complete green income measure, GNNP. Growth of GNNP will 
become faster than NNP at point T. Because the EKC for China peaks later than the 
'
' GNNP  54
NRKC and because of an additional price effect (pollution is a normal good), T is 
shown as greater than   
'. T
GNNP: Empirics 
In what follows, we provide a partial estimate for GNNP by subtracting three 
components from NNP: net forest depletion, mineral depletion, and energy 
depletion.
21 Data are in 2004 U.S. dollars. Table 10 provides the value of each 
component. 
Table 10. Partial Estimate of Green Net National Product, Selected Years 1975–
2000 
Year  NNP  Net Forest Depletion  Mineral Depletion  Energy Depletion  GNNP 
1975  159.07  0.10  1.26  19.62  138.08 
1980  213.85  0.35  1.83  38.66  173.02 
1985  289.07  0.85  2.54  40.88  244.80 
1990  412.76  1.39  3.28  33.58  374.50 
1995  677.74  1.47  3.24  31.11  641.91 
2000  1,061.41  0.73  2.65  31.76  1,026.28 
 
Note: Ten-year moving averages are reported, with the exception of 2000, which is a three-year average. 
                                                 
21 Forest, energy, and mineral depletion data were obtained from the World Bank’s “Adjusted Net 
Savings: Results” spreadsheet, downloaded from www.worldbank.org/environmentaleconomics, 
December 1, 2004. GNI data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2004.   55
 
Figure 13 illustrates the growth of NNP versus our partially corrected 
measure, denoted   Unlike the theoretical construct, which is based on 
efficient extraction profiles, the empirical growth rates are more uneven and illustrate 
the possibility that   can grow slow, faster, and then slower again than NNP 
in contrast to the theoretical pattern that has only one such switch point. 
'. PGNNP
' PGNNP
Nonetheless, the empirical pattern approximates the theoretical one; that is, 
until the early 1980s, NNP was almost always growing faster than   but 
starting in 1982, the pattern was reversed with a few exceptions. Note also that the 
difference in NNP and   is rather small and after the mid-1980s, growth in 
 is closely approximated by NNP. Overall, the partial evidence given earlier 
suggests that China has already reached the point in the theoretical depiction where 
GNNP starts to grow faster than NNP. As data become available on the value of air 
and water pollution, however, a more comprehensive GNNP may reveal a later 
turning point at which GNNP begins to grow faster. Inasmuch as the growth rates of 
the two measures are quite close, however, even a revised estimate would not show 
GNNP growing appreciably slower than NNP. To the extent that actual pollution and 
natural resource extraction vary from their optimal quantities, the potential remains 
for GNNP to grow even faster, as resource and environmental inefficiencies are 
removed over time. 
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 (Source: World Bank, 2001a, 2001c, 2004.) 
GNNP accounting is still evolving, as statisticians struggle to design 
measurement protocols that conform to new theoretical requirements. As a result, we 
find numerous of partial estimates that explore the gap between conventional and 
green national accounts and obtain differing results (Smil, 1996; Mao et al., 1997; ; 
Du, Wang, and Long, 1999; Hou, Qi, and Yu, 1999; Lei, 1999). Most recently, in 
2004, SEPA and the National Bureau of Statistics enlisted provincial and local 
authorities in an effort to quantify green GDP. The team released the first national 
green-GDP report in September 2006, estimating total losses for 2005 at 64.5 billion   57
U.S. dollars (Ansfield and Liu, 2007). How much of this difference arises from the 
comprehensive nature of the 2006 report versus the partial estimates reported earlier 
(e.g., the 2006 report includes both soil depletion and water pollution) and how much 
is due to methodological differences is not yet clear. It is possible that the more 
comprehensive measure would show that sustainable development in China has not 
yet reached the turning point where GNNP is growing faster than NNP. 
GENUINE CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
Genuine Capital Accumulation: Theory 
Growth theory provides a mechanism to expand national accounting and an indicator 
of when economies are on an unsustainable development path. The World Bank has 
dubbed this indicator adjusted net saving or genuine saving (see, e.g., Hamilton, 
2000). Genuine saving measures the rate of saving in an economy after taking into 
account pollution, depletion of natural resources, and investment in human capital. 
We illustrate a modified version of this concept in Figure 14. Define genuine capital 
accumulation (GKA) as the value of produced capital accumulation, , KK p &  plus 
natural capital accumulation,   This is equivalent to capital accumulation 
minus natural capital depletion. Combining the pattern of produced capital 
accumulation from neoclassical growth theory with the NRKC discussion in section 
“Natural Resources Kuznets Curve Theory,” note that GKA grows faster than 
produced capital accumulation after   
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Figure 14. Capital, Natural Capital, and Genuine Capital Accumulation 
 
 
Genuine Capital Accumulation: Empirics 
Using the World Bank data from the previous sections, we develop an estimate of 
China’s GKA from 1990 to 2001. As evident in Table 11, GKA has been increasing 
over time, suggesting that the country’s growth is not unsustainable. Figure 15 
illustrates this acceleration.   59
Table 11. Genuine Capital Accumulation, 1990–2001 
1990  $48.6 
1991  $58.6 
1992  $69.0 
1993  $74.5 
1994  $150.1 
1995  $160.6 
1996  $184.1 
1997  $233.9 
1998  $248.4 
1999  $248.6 
2000  $218.9 
2001  $254.4 
 
Note: Values are in billion U.S. dollars. 
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After ignoring the environmental consequences of economic policy decisions during 
the period of Mao Zedong’s leadership (Shapiro, 2001), China’s government became 
somewhat more vigilant about environmental regulation in the 1990s. The SEPA was 
established in 1998, and environmental laws and regulations began to appear shortly 
after its establishment. 
Since then, China’s environmental policies have evolved largely in response 
to domestic events (e.g., sandstorms in Beijing, the 1998 Yangtze floods, growing 
realization of health problems related to air pollution) and to China’s growing 
involvement in international environmental diplomacy (e.g., the ratification of the 
Montreal Protocol). Attention has also been increasing due to a domestic   61
environmental movement, including growing environmental concerns among China’s 
urban elites, many of whom are keenly aware that Chinese environmental conditions 
lag behind the norm in urban areas in more developed nations. 
The main regulatory framework to date is command and control, with SEPA 
issuing regulations, sending inspectors to check on implementation, and imposing 
fines on violators. These regulations include discharge limits based on both total 
emissions and ambient concentrations of emissions. New manufacturing enterprises 
are required to receive certification before production can begin, and time limits are 
set for compliance of existing enterprises. These regulations are far from consistent 
across firms, with enforcement typically focusing on large firms and often neglecting 
small-scale enterprises, especially TVEs located in rural areas. This in part reflects 
the tendency of officials to overlook pollution from enterprises that support local 
economies with jobs and tax revenue. 
There are significant difficulties with enforcement, due in part to local 
government incentive structures geared to emphasize growth. Local officials 
sometimes prevent inspectors from completing their work or pay them to overlook 
violations. In other instances, local officials evade orders to close down polluting 
plants. For example, when the three-year “zero-hour operation” to clean up the Huai 
River targeted small factories along the river beginning in 1998, local officials sought 
to keep plants running by amalgamating small mills into larger units or by stopping 
daytime production but operating the plants at night. Similar problems surround   62
efforts to compel factories to add pollution abatement facilities. One-third of such 
equipment operates only during inspections. One-third sit idle because managers see 
pollution abatement equipment as imposing excessive costs. Only the remaining third 
are operating as required by regulation standards (Watson et al., 2000). 
Firms may purchase waste treatment equipment in accord with requirements 
but neglect to install the equipment. A joint effort among Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), Qinghua University, and the Swiss Federal Institutes of 
Technology to improve boiler efficiency begun in over 200 sites in Henan, Jiangsu, 
and Shanxi provinces initially failed, despite developing a number of well-tailored 
and inexpensive measures for the various boiler sites. The MIT-led team found that 
the plant directors had no immediate incentive to upgrade the technologies in their 
plants. The team then researched the linkage between pollution and local health costs 
to help persuade local officials of the project’s importance (Watson et al., 2000). The 
Watson study also found that perceived additional cost causes many industries to 
disregard end-of-the-pipe technologies. Even if multinationals provide pollution-
control equipment, Chinese firms may fail to respond because the cost of installing 
and operating these devices is much higher than the financial penalty they might 
suffer for exceeding pollution limits. 
Despite such difficulties, there is evidence that environmental incentive 
systems have reduced pollution discharge intensities. Analysis of both provincial- 
and plant-level data on water pollution suggests that discharge intensities are highly   63
responsive to variations in provincial levies (Wang and Wheeler, 2003, 2005). 
Similarly, Wang (2002) shows that plant-level expenditures on end-of-pipe 
wastewater treatment are strongly responsive to pollution charges. The pollution 
charge system has been in place for over twenty years. The main problem is that the 
charges are too low. If prices were increased, the response would probably deliver a 
significant reduction in the total quantity of pollution. 
However, other command and control regulations such as enforcement and 
environmental zoning appear to have little impact on abatement expenditures. 
Inspections, rather than pollution levies, are found to have a significant effect on 
firm-level environmental compliance (Dasgupta et al., 2001). 
In a 2003 empirical study, Wang et al. examine the determinants of 
environmental enforcement (Wang et al., 2003). The authors analyze the 
determinants of firms’ relative bargaining power with local environmental authorities 
in connection with the enforcement of pollution charges. Results from the study 
suggest that private-sector firms have less bargaining power than state-owned 
enterprises and that firms facing adverse financial situations have more bargaining 
power and tend to pay relatively smaller pollution charges. The greater the social 
impact of a firm’s emissions, the less bargaining power it has with local 
environmental authorities. 
Further difficulties arise from poor coordination between environmental 
policies and other official measures that affect the behavior of plant operators and   64
other resource users. In particular, China has been very slow to break out of a long 
tradition of low pricing for electricity, water, wastewater treatment, and, more 
recently, gasoline. This encourages excess use of water, coal, and other resources and 
discourages recycling, all of which may have negative consequences for efforts to 
reduce effluents and improve ambient air and water quality. 
SEPA is pushing to expand public disclosure of environmental performance 
as a means of directing public attention to severe pollution problems that persist 
despite the application of traditional regulatory instruments (Wang et al., 2004; Wang 
and Wu, 2004). Since 1998, SEPA has worked to establish GreenWatch, a public 
disclosure program for polluters. Adopted from a program in Indonesia, the 
GreenWatch rates firms’ environmental performance from best to worst in five colors 
– green, blue, yellow, red, and black – and publicizes these ratings through the 
media. In 2000, pilot programs were implemented in Zhenjiang (Jiangsu) and Hohhot 
(Inner Mongolia). Reaction to the programs has been positive, leading Jiangsu 
Province to expand implementation to the entire province in 2001. SEPA is currently 
preparing for nationwide implementation of public disclosure. 
Experimentation with new economic incentives includes noncompliance 
fines, consumer subsidies for energy-saving products, discharge permits, sulfur 
emission fees, and emissions trading. Select provinces and cities allowed trading of 
sulfur emission rights since 1997. There has also been a concerted effort to   65
decentralize pollution by moving major effluent sources – most notably, Beijing’s 
Capital Steel complex – away from urban centers. 
Recent developments in the policy arena include a ban on leaded gasoline, 
stringent new emission requirements for cars, preparation for Beijing Olympics, 
escalating attacks on “growth at any cost” and “extensive growth,” and strong 
emphasis by top leaders on “quality” growth and on reducing the social costs of 
economic development. All of this suggests that environmental issues may begin to 
get the high-level priority that seems essential to addressing some of the incentive 
issues and policy conflicts mentioned earlier. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite disparaging reports, the available figures show that China’s growth is 
sustainable. Nonetheless, opportunities for improving environmental and natural 
resource management and accounting practices abound. After years of neglect, 
environmental issues have attracted growing attention within China’s economic 
policy community. Although many regulations have been initiated, numerous 
opportunities remain for aligning private incentives with the public interest, 
especially on an ecosystem level. 
With respect to air pollution, available statistics suggest that China has passed 
the flat part of the EKC for two of three major pollutants, consistent with its expected 
progress at current per capita income. Available measures show some improvement   66
in urban air quality, in part because of decentralization of industry away from the 
pollution receptors, which remain clustered in the traditional industrial areas. 
Significant decreases in pollution per unit of output are offset by rapidly increasing 
industrial production. Despite considerable effort, there has been less success in 
controlling water pollution. 
One might surmise from popular accounts of pollution and resource depletion 
that GNNP, a more accurate indicator of economic welfare, must lag far behind 
traditional measures of economic performance, such as NNP. In reality, our partial 
adjustments suggest that GNNP for most of the last two decades has grown slightly 
faster than NNP. Even allowing for serious problems of water scarcity and water 
pollution, the possibility of increased air pollution outside of the urban core, and a 
devalued forest stock, future efforts to compile more comprehensive environmental 
accounts are unlikely to show that GNNP is growing noticeably slower than NNP. 
This is largely because the wedge between the two measures is small and swamped 
by other components of growth. Nor is China’s growth unsustainable. Indeed, its 
GKA is large and accelerating. 
Despite China’s impressive record of environmentally adjusted economic 
growth and GKA, many challenges remain. Perhaps the most serious concerns 
increasing water scarcity, especially in urban areas in the North, and the nationwide 
decline in water quality. In the past, China has successfully increased available water 
resources by building storage and delivery infrastructure. This strategy is not   67
sustainable, due to the declining natural limits on exploitable water sources and 
increasingly costs of tapping the limited unexploited sources. Despite these 
difficulties, abundant opportunities for reducing waste through demand management 
remain, thus exemplifying the common belief that the Chinese character for crisis 
embeds the character for opportunity. 
Similarly, while China has recorded substantial progress in decentralizing 
pollution control, substantial opportunities remain. Weaknesses in public 
administration, for example, have limited the impact of initial forays into emission-
permit trading. Any scheme of fines, levies, or permits is only as strong as its 
implementation. In China today, inspectors are often unable or unwilling to impose 
effective controls. Measuring the declining quantity and quality of China’s water 
resources remains an important task for future research. 
Reforms are also needed to improve environmental accounting. For example, 
efficient air pollution control requires not only monitoring the quantities and types of 
emissions but also distinguishing them according to damages by receptor–source. 
Sampling protocols and indexing of pollution according to health risks are also 
needed. Similar challenges surround the measurement of natural resource 
depreciation, especially accounting for the changing composition and value of 
resource stocks. 
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